SUMAN K SHRIVASTAVA 

A State is Born

The creation of Jharkhand on November 15, 2000 marked the culmination of a century-long movement advanced by both tribal and non-tribal communities inhabiting the Chotanagpur and Santhal Pargana regions. The movement traces its roots to the early twentieth century under the leadership of figures such as Jaipal Singh Munda, and gathered momentum in the 1960s and 1970s when issues of identity, land alienation, resource extraction, and administrative neglect became increasingly pronounced.

Despite generating substantial revenue for undivided Bihar due to its mineral wealth, the region experienced chronic underdevelopment. Public infrastructure—roads, schools, health facilities, irrigation—remained inadequate. A widely shared perception existed that local youth were disadvantaged in public employment due to sustained migration from northern and central Bihar.

Consequently, the advent of Statehood generated high expectations. The newly formed State was anticipated to safeguard land rights, cultural identity, linguistic autonomy, and, importantly, equitable access to public employment. It is in this post-Statehood context that a pivotal question emerged:

Who should qualify as a “local resident” for the purposes of public employment in Jharkhand?

This enquiry was not merely administrative; it became a central axis around which political mobilisation, legal contestation, and identity formation revolved in the nascent State.

The Idea of “Local” in Jharkhand’s Political Memory

The discourse on “locals” and “outsiders” has a deep sociopolitical lineage in Jharkhand. Beginning in the 1970s, Adivasi and Moolvasi organisations articulated concerns that migrants—particularly from north Bihar—were occupying government posts in disproportionate numbers and exerting undue influence over administrative structures.

Within this discourse, land records assumed symbolic significance. The 1932 khatiyan (record-of-rights) was regarded by many Adivasi and old-settler groups as the last authoritative register capturing the region’s original inhabitants. For others, however, it represented a static and exclusionary benchmark that ignored nearly a century of inter-regional migration, displacement, and settlement.

Thus, even prior to Statehood, the debate concerned not only entitlement to land and employment but also the historical narrative of belonging. After 2000, these debates intensified and became embedded within the legal and constitutional framework of the new State. Political actors invoked the rhetoric of “sons of the soil,” yet the constitutional limits on residence-based preferences imposed significant constraints on State policy.

The 2002 Domicile Turmoil and the Outbreak of Violence

By early 2002, tensions surrounding the proposed definition of “local resident” escalated into one of the first major public-order challenges of the new State. As the government moved toward adopting a definition based on the 1932 khatiyan, a polarised environment emerged.

Pro-domicile groups—including Adivasi-Moolvasi platforms, youth organisations, and student bodies—mobilised in protest demanding strict employment protections. Conversely, anti-domicile groups, largely comprising long-settled migrants from north Bihar, argued that such an approach would disenfranchise thousands who had lived, worked, and contributed to the region for decades.

Clashes erupted in Ranchi, Jamshedpur, Gumla, and Lohardaga. Violent confrontations involved stone pelting, burning of vehicles, forceful bandhs, and police action. Several individuals sustained injuries, and public property suffered extensive damage.
This unrest provided a compelling social backdrop to the legal challenge that soon unfolded before the Jharkhand High Court.

The 2002 Notifications — A Bold and Controversial Step

Shortly after Statehood, the Jharkhand Government adopted a 1982 Bihar Government circular to define “local persons” for public employment. This was formalised through a notification dated September 22, 2001 issued under Section 85 of the Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000. The circular relied almost exclusively on the khatiyan-based lineage test.

In 2002, Jharkhand extended this definition to Class III and Class IV posts, with the caveat that preferential treatment would apply only when “all other things were equal.”

Under this framework, a “local person” was effectively one who:

• had his or his ancestors’ names recorded in the 1932 survey; or
  • could be certified by five such individuals as belonging to a family residing in the district for three generations (approximately 75–90 years).

This definition excluded even individuals who had migrated to the region prior to the 1947 Partition—persons who had resided in Jharkhand for more than half a century. It also excluded teachers, miners, clerical staff, and labourers who had lived permanently in the region.

The approach privileged ancestry over actual residence, making lineage rather than social, cultural, or economic integration the determinant of local identity. Unsurprisingly, a public interest litigation filed by Prashant Vidyarthy, a lawyer, reached the Jharkhand High Court, inaugurating the State’s first major constitutional adjudication.

Article 16: The Constitutional Compass

At the heart of the dispute lay Article 16 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality of opportunity in public employment.

• Article 16(2) prohibits discrimination based on place of birth, residence, caste, religion, race, sex, or descent.
  • Article 16(3) allows only Parliament to prescribe residence as a qualification for certain public posts.

To elucidate these provisions, the Court referred extensively to the Constituent Assembly Debates (Volume VII, Book No. 2). Several members expressed deep concern that provincial barriers such as “Bengal for Bengalis” or “Madras for Madrasis” threatened national unity. They acknowledged that certain posts might require knowledge of local language or customs, but uniformly rejected long-term residence requirements. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar stated unequivocally that such qualifications, if needed at all, must be authorised solely by Parliament.

These debates provided interpretive guidance for the High Court’s analysis.

Supreme Court Precedent and Its Significance

In addition to the Constituent Assembly Debates, the Court relied heavily on established Supreme Court jurisprudence:

A.V.S. Narasimha Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1970)
A five-judge Bench held that Article 16(3) confers exclusive legislative power upon Parliament to prescribe residence requirements for public employment. State legislatures and State executives are expressly barred from creating such requirements.

Union of India v. Sanjay Pant (1993)
The Supreme Court ruled that any adverse employment action based on a candidate not being a “local resident” is unconstitutional unless Parliament has enacted a law under Article 16(3). Since Parliament had not done so, residence-based restrictions imposed through executive orders were deemed invalid.

Together, these decisions established the doctrinal boundaries within which Jharkhand’s policies were evaluated.

The High Court Speaks: The 2002 Judgment

The Jharkhand High Court held that the State lacked authority to impose residence-based preferences through either legislation or executive notification. In the absence of a Parliamentary enactment under Article 16(3), the impugned notifications exceeded constitutional limits.

Unconstitutionality of the 1932-Based Definition

The Court held that the khatiyan-based definition:

• excluded bona fide residents who had lived in Jharkhand for decades,
  • failed to recognise migrants displaced during the Partition who later settled permanently in the region,
  • made ancestry a condition for public employment, and
  • violated Articles 14, 16, and the citizenship principles embodied in Articles 5 and 6.

Permissibility of Limited Cultural Preference

The Court clarified that while residence could not serve as a barrier, the State could require knowledge of local customs, language, or conditions as a supplementary factor, but only as a tie-breaker when candidates were otherwise equally placed. This distinction between permissible cultural preference and impermissible exclusion formed an important part of the Court’s reasoning.

The Need for an Inclusive Definition

The Court criticised the State’s definition as unduly narrow, mechanistic, and lacking rational nexus. It distinguished between bona fide residents—individuals who had established lasting ties through domicile, work, education, and family—and “mere birds of passage,” who had no intention to settle. The Court insisted that the former category could not constitutionally be excluded.

Justice S.J. Mukhopadhaya, in his concurring opinion, emphasised the principle of single citizenship and warned against the dangers of provincialism. He observed that even Parliament’s power under Article 16(3) is subject to the basic structure doctrine.

The Court suggested adopting the more inclusive framework contained in the State Government’s Resolution dated 29 April 2002, which considered multiple indicators of residency.

Thus, the judgment of 2002 became Jharkhand’s first landmark pronouncement on residence and equality in public employment.

The Debate Lives On

The Soni Kumari Judgment (2020)

The question resurfaced in Soni Kumari v. State of Jharkhand (2020), where the High Court struck down district-level residence requirements imposed through executive orders in Fifth Schedule districts. The Court reaffirmed the principles laid down in 2002 and reiterated that:

• no executive order can impose residence-based exclusion;
  • Article 16(3) requires a Parliamentary mandate; and
  • residence requirements cannot be used to reserve public posts.

The Return of the 1932 Khatiyan — The 2022 Bill

A. Contents of the Bill

The Jharkhand Definition of Local Persons Bill, 2022 sought to define “local persons” exclusively through the 1932 khatiyan and to reserve Class III and IV posts for such individuals. This revived the very criteria invalidated by the High Court in 2002 and 2020.

B. Governor’s Objections (2023)

The Bill was returned by the Governor, who cited violations of Articles 14, 15, and 16, reliance on a highly exclusionary ancestral standard, and the Attorney General’s opinion that the Bill was unconstitutional. The Governor also noted Supreme Court precedents disallowing complete reservation on the basis of domicile.

C. Re-Passage and Ninth Schedule Strategy

The Legislative Assembly repassed the Bill in December 2023 and referred it for Presidential assent, seeking Ninth Schedule protection. However, under the I.R. Coelho judgment, laws inserted into the Ninth Schedule after April 24, 1973 must withstand basic structure review. As equality and single citizenship are part of the basic structure, the Bill remains constitutionally vulnerable.

D. Current Status (2024–25)

As of 2025:

• the Bill is not law;
  • it is not operational;
  • it awaits Presidential consideration.

Legacy and Unfinished Questions

What Jharkhand’s Legal Journey Shows Us

Jharkhand’s trajectory illustrates the persistent tension between regional assertions of identity and the constitutional commitment to equality of opportunity. The 2002 judgment, reaffirmed in 2020, underscores that while States may consider cultural or linguistic familiarity as a limited criterion, residence-based exclusion is impermissible without Parliamentary sanction. Even Parliament must operate within the bounds of the basic structure.

The Road Ahead

Over the last twenty-five years, Jharkhand’s attempts to define “local residents” have repeatedly collided with constitutional guarantees of equality, free movement, and single citizenship. Across Prashant Vidyarthi (2002), Soni Kumari (2020), and the 1932 Khatiyan Bill (2022), the judiciary has consistently held that:

Residence, by itself, cannot be the basis for exclusion from public employment.

The unresolved questions remain:

• Who constitutes a “local resident”?
  • Can the 1932 khatiyan serve as a legitimate indicator of identity?
  • Should Parliament establish a national framework under Article 16(3)?
  • How should the State reconcile historical injustice with constitutional equality?

It is notable that Parliament has invoked Article 16(3) only once—the Public Employment (Requirement as to Residence) Act, 1957—and even that statute was a temporary measure linked to State reorganisation. Importantly, the Act does not authorise States to determine who is a “local person.”

What began as Jharkhand’s first constitutional controversy remains a continuing debate, shaping the political and legal fabric of the State. The story is ongoing, and its next chapter will depend on both constitutional discipline and political prudence.